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file Aug

18 July 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: CIA Librarian

SUBJECT: Procurement of Cuban Publications and Related Problems

*OK - Phoned AL today, - suggested he
checks out with Security, then
individually contact each customer.
Progress report later.*

ASSUMPTION

25X1A2d2

The following proposal is made on the assumption that a) the Cunningham Amendment to the U. S. Postal Rate Bill will not stop our direct commercial source, [REDACTED] or b) if the Amendment does interfere with it, the Amendment will be modified to remove such restriction; or c) if the Amendment does interfere with this source, and no modifications can be made, then discreet approaches to the U. S. Customs and/or Postal authorities will be made to arrange for suitable exemptions.

CURRENT SITUATION

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1. There are, currently, two projects which supply the Intelligence Community with Cuban publications, [REDACTED]. The latter is the inter-agency pooling arrangement under which all agencies deliver to CIA Library all "hard" copies of Cuban serials, and CIA then redistributes the "hard" copies and/or microfilmed reproductions, as necessary, on the basis of an agreed upon priority. [REDACTED] is the direct-mail procurement project of Ly/AB which services CIA components only.

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2. [REDACTED] is working well, providing rapid and reliable service to the consumers. Air service provides the publications in 3-4 days after publication, while surface mail requires 3 1/2 - 4 weeks. Costs for surface mail are quite low; air mail, while expensive, is still probably cheaper than the reproduction system and far more efficient if one considers that the high costs of the [REDACTED] reproduction are also coupled with 4-week surface delivery plus 3-4 weeks delay for reproduction service.

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3. [REDACTED] is not only slower and rather costly, but has undergone progressive deterioration. Since May of this year, there has been an almost complete drying up of sources except for the [REDACTED]. These sources, moreover, provide only two copies of each title requested (one of which is given directly to State Department, ARA, and the other used for reproduction) and only a very limited list of titles. The reluctance of these foreign governments to undertake the service at all has meant that new titles could not readily be added nor old ones dropped as requirements shifted. [REDACTED] is slow, costly, inflexible.

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Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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MAJOR PROBLEMS


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1. Project [REDACTED] was originally set up as a stopgap measure; it was part of the original agreement that CIA would seek alternative, reliable sources of supply which could be utilized by all. The other agencies, too, would attempt to solve the problem on behalf of all. The history of the various attempts is well known and need not be reiterated here. Suffice it to say that only CIA's [REDACTED] and the Library of Congress' exchange arrangement have proven successful.

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2. The LC arrangement is reportedly satisfactory for that agency. However, it is too slow for some of the other agencies and the payments system for direct purchase (a U.S. Treasury check) is objected to by State for its own and USIA's use for obvious reasons.

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PROPOSED SOLUTION

It is believed that the following plan will prove practical in operation, will provide the necessary "hard" copies to each agency in the form and time-span suitable to their needs and budgetary limitations, and will provide suitable alternatives to the payments problem for each agency. The basic plan is to drop [REDACTED] within 30 days, the time calculated as necessary to shift over the outside agencies to the new arrangement. State will be left, with USIA, to share the [REDACTED] LC will continue with its present apparently satisfactory arrangement; CIA is already well-covered by [REDACTED] NSA and the military services will be picked up by [REDACTED] Details [REDACTED] for each agency follow, showing advantages for each.

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1. STATE DEPARTMENT (ARA) and USIA: [REDACTED] between them, provide just two copies of selected titles. One can go to ARA, and one to USIA. With only these two agencies with their very similar needs to be served, it should be far easier to make adjustments (if any are required) in the specific titles received and this will obviate [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] objections to bulk. Each agency will be assured a "hard" copy 25X1X7

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instead of a reproduction, and there will be less delay in receipt... reproduction now adds a month to the mailing time. Since the [REDACTED] have declined to bill for the publications they send, and the [REDACTED] are not excessive, the budgetary problem for State and USIA will be lessened since they will not have to share reproduction costs. Finally, State and USIA can pay for the publications through the [REDACTED] and avoid the objectionable feature of the Treasury checks; neither agency is well prepared to set up a clandestine service such as [REDACTED]

2. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS: Appears satisfied with its own arrangements for exchange-purchase. Its needs are neither so catholic nor so demanding in the time sense as those of the Intelligence Community agencies. It is not practical to overload the [REDACTED] channel with LC's needs, nor should it prove necessary.

3. NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY: Exploratory and strictly "off-the-record" conversations have been held with [REDACTED] on the possibility of supplying them. Some idea of the costs involved, the time factor, etc. have been discussed with her, but none of the methodology -- particular care was exercised to prevent [REDACTED] from assuming that we were soliciting customers. NSA has indicated that they would give priority to six readily-available titles (one subscription to each), and would request five other titles (one each) if the channel permits and that "money is no object if the titles can be obtained." It is recommended strongly that NSA be picked up by [REDACTED] even if other aspects of this plan are rejected. ~~Further brief mention of this is made in paragraph 5 below.~~

4. THE MILITARY SERVICES: The possibility of an expanded [REDACTED] has not been discussed with the military services. However, on the basis of their current use of [REDACTED] and with the caveat that they will be held to really essential items, i.e., no "window dressing", it is estimated that the total number of subscriptions for the military services would be not more than ten (10) in toto. Even allowing the full eleven titles for NSA, another 10-11 for the military should not overburden the [REDACTED] facility.

5. OTHER AGENCIES: We should not undertake to cover other agencies such as Commerce, Agriculture, HEW, etc. at this time. Their needs may be legitimate, but are less pressing than those of the Intelligence Community. Much of their needs can probably be adequately, if minimally, covered by State and FDD reports. If they have actual need for "hard" copies, it is suggested that they either utilize LC's services or employ the same approach on their own as LC does. They do not have the problems of "cover" that the Intelligence Community does, nor the protocol problem of payments that State and USIA feel they face.

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SUMMATION:

25X1X7 1. Any objections on the part of State to being "left out" can be 25X1A2d2
diplomatically handled on the basis of the high costs of [REDACTED] subscriptions,
the price advantage (to them) of the [REDACTED] the "ex-
clusiveness" of these sources for them, and the advantages of flexibility
(by reducing bulk) and time savings (by cutting out the reproduction delays).
It can further be argued to them that the other agencies cannot utilize
these sources as readily, and that they will be getting the same material
in just as good a time and quantity consideration as the others. In a
25X1A2d2 pinch, and if they can afford the price, we could agree to provide one or
two titles to them by air through [REDACTED] to settle a dispute.

2. The transfer of funds between the agencies would present no unusual
problems: the deposits to the bank account would be made only by CIA, as
at present, and detailed accounting would be made only to CIA's fiscal people.
The outside agencies would simply be billed for gross amounts and would
reimburse CIA as they normally would for any other service of common concern
provided by CIA for the Intelligence Community. No details of the [REDACTED] 25X1A2d2
project need be provided anyone outside of CIA; they are simply told that
the items can be procured and that the cost is so much by surface or so
much by air. Thus, there is no security problem involved beyond the one
already in existence.

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[REDACTED]
Chief, Acquisitions Branch
CIA Library

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